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FROM CLIMATE CHANGE AND HURRICANES TO
ECOLOGICAL NUISANCES:
COMMON LAW REMEDIES FOR PUBLIC
LAW FAILURES?
Stephen M. Johnson*
INTRODUCTION
Over the past few years, there has been a minor renaissance in the
use of common law actions, especially public and private nuisance, to
address environmental problems not being adequately addressed by
public law, such as climate change and natural disasters like
Hurricane Katrina.1 Ever since the explosion of public law in
response to environmental problems in the 1970s, the common law
has provided remedies for personal injury and property damage that
are not available under public law,2 and avenues of relief for
problems that were ignored by public law. The common law and
public law should not, however, be viewed as alternatives for
addressing environmental problems, but as complements. There is an
Escheresque quality to the relationship between public law and
common law, in that public law continues to evolve in light of
developments in the common law, while the common law is

∗ Associate Dean and Professor, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University. B.S., J.D.
Villanova University, LL.M. George Washington University School of Law.
1. See, e.g., Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009), vacated, reh’g granted en
banc, 598 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2010), appeal dismissed, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010); Connecticut v.
Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009); In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 647 F.
Supp. 2d 644 (E.D. La. 2009); Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D.
Cal. 2009); California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68547 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 17, 2007); Barasich v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., 467 F. Supp. 2d. 676 (E.D. La.
2006).
2. The federal environmental statutes, such as the Clean Water Act, Clean Air Act, and Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act, provide for civil and criminal penalties, as well as injunctive relief, but
do not authorize courts to award money damages. See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean
Water Act), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319, 1365 (2006); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42
U.S.C. §§ 6928, 6972 (2006); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7413, 7604 (2006). The Superfund law
authorizes courts to award “response costs” to plaintiffs but not money damages. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607
(2006).
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influenced, in turn, by developments in public law.3 Vibrant common
law remedies are an essential complement to public law for effective
programs to minimize harms to the environment and human health.
Several recent federal court decisions involving nuisance or
negligence claims for damages related to climate change and
Hurricane Katrina appear, at first blush, to provide strong incentives
for an even greater focus on common law to address environmental
problems. Private nuisance actions could potentially be used more
widely to address destruction or degradation of waters or wetlands
that are no longer protected by the Clean Water Act or habitats that
are not protected by the Endangered Species Act, or problems created
by non-point source pollution, non-hazardous waste management, or
locally unwanted land use siting.4 Similarly, public nuisance lawsuits
could potentially target other actions that contribute to global climate
change or address problems that may be caused in the future by
nanotechnology, new toxic chemicals, or new uses of existing toxic
chemicals.5
However, the recent federal court decisions should not be viewed
as fundamentally altering the role that common law actions play in
protecting the environment and human health. It will still be difficult
to rely on the common law to solve these broader environmental
problems. The recent decisions removed some jurisdictional and
standing barriers to common law actions, but many impediments
remain. The primary impediment, which was not significantly
affected by the recent decisions, is the difficulty of proving causation
in the common law actions.6 The recent decisions may have made it
easier to bring common law actions but not necessarily to win them.
Furthermore, the decisions leave several standing and preemption
questions unresolved, so it may not even be easier than before to
bring common law actions in some circumstances.

3. See Alexandra B. Klass, Common Law and Federalism in the Age of the Regulatory State, 92
IOWA L. REV. 545, 547–49 (2007).
4. See infra notes 162–72 and accompanying text.
5. See infra note 173 and accompanying text.
6. See infra Part V.A.
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To the extent that the recent decisions spark an increase in
common law litigation to address some of the problems not addressed
by public law, though, the litigation could spur legislative changes to
the public law. Consequently, the decisions may ultimately have a
greater impact on public law than on common law.
Part I of this article explores the role that the common law played
in addressing environmental problems prior to the development of a
robust public law regime in the 1970s and the changing role of
common law as the new regime was implemented. Part II of the
article examines the reasons why there has been a renaissance in
common law actions and why the trend could continue. Part III of the
article discusses the recent federal appellate court decisions that
could accelerate the common law renaissance, as well as some other
recent federal court decisions that could slow the renaissance. All of
these decisions involved harm caused by global climate change,
Hurricane Katrina, or both. Part IV of the article identifies
environmental problems not adequately addressed under public law
that might be the subject of more aggressive common law
enforcement if the renaissance continues and discusses the
advantages of addressing those problems through common law
actions. Finally, Part V explores the continuing limitations of
common law that have not been remedied by the recent decisions.
I. THE 1970S: THE ASCENDANCY OF PUBLIC LAW
From the dawn of the age of industrialization, the common law
developed as a powerful tool to address pollution problems.7 Private
parties and governments sought to combat environmental problems
through public and private nuisance, trespass, negligence, and strict
liability lawsuits.8 State and federal courts frequently awarded
damages to neighbors of paper mills, refineries, chemical factories,
and other industries that were harmed by pollution from those
7. See J.B. RUHL, JOHN COPELAND NAGLE & JAMES SALZMAN, THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 930–31 (1st ed. 2008).
8. See Klass, supra note 3, at 567.
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activities, or the activities themselves were enjoined.9 Although many
of the lawsuits were based on state common law, some of the
lawsuits involving interstate pollution were brought under federal
common law.10
Over time, however, federal, state and local governments adopted
laws and regulations to address environmental problems. Although
the trend began with state and local efforts early in the twentieth
century,11 public environmental law became ubiquitous with the
flood of federal environmental legislation in the 1970s.12 As public
environmental law grew, the number of common law environmental
claims declined sharply.13
While common law claims declined, neither Congress nor the
states sought to fully displace common law remedies by adopting
environmental protection statutes and regulations. Indeed, most of the
federal environmental statutes include provisions that explicitly
preserve more stringent state and local remedies.14 In some cases, the
adoption of federal statutes will eliminate federal common law
remedies. For instance, in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, the Supreme
Court held that the Clean Water Act displaced federal common law

9. See, e.g., City of Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334 (1933); Georgia v.
Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907); McCleery v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 140 F. 951, 952–
53 (C.C.D. Utah 1904); Steifer v. City of Kansas City, 267 P.2d 474 (Kan. 1954); Susquehanna
Fertilizer Co. v. Malone, 20 A. 900, 902 (Md. 1890); Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 101 N.E. 805
(N.Y. 1913); Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 77 S.E.2d 682, 690 (N.C. 1953); Martin v. Reynolds Metals
Co., 342 P.2d 790, 794 (Or. 1959); Costas v. City of Fond du Lac, 129 N.W.2d 217 (Wis. 1964).
10. See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (dealing with
interstate water pollution); Tenn. Copper, 206 U.S. 230 (addressing interstate air pollution).
11. See Klass, supra note 3, at 567; Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation:
A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 578–79 (2001).
12. See Klass, supra note 3, at 567; ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, CHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER, ALAN S.
MILLER & JAMES P. LEAPE, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE & POLICY 88 (6th ed.
2009).
13. See H. Marlow Green, Can the Common Law Survive in the Modern Statutory Environment?, 8
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 89, 109 (1998) (finding a sharp decline in the number of common law
actions brought after 1975); see also J.B. Ruhl, Making Nuisance Ecological, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
753, 754 (2008). Professor J.B. Ruhl suggests that the explosion of public law diminished the use of
nuisance law to address species and habitat protection just as it diminished the use of nuisance law to
address pollution control problems. Id. at 755–56.
14. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1365(e), 1370 (2006); 42 U.S.C. §§ 6929, 6972(f) (2006); 42 U.S.C.
§ 9614 (2006).
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nuisance claims involving discharges of water pollution that were
regulated by the Act’s permitting program.15
The reach of City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, however, is limited.
First, the Court did not find that federal common law was displaced
merely because Congress had enacted federal water pollution
legislation. Instead, the Court analyzed the structure of the statute and
concluded that Congress implicitly displaced federal common law
with respect to the plaintiff’s claim because Congress established a
comprehensive regulatory program to address the pollution
discharges that were at issue in the case.16 It is possible, therefore,
that the Court may find that other federal environmental statutes that
do not establish a comprehensive permitting program to address
environmental problems do not displace federal common law.17
More importantly, though the Supreme Court, in City of
Milwaukee v. Illinois, held that the Clean Water Act displaced federal
common law regarding the discharges involved in the case, the Court
did not foreclose state common law actions.18 Significantly, several
years later, in International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, the Supreme
Court concluded that although the Clean Water Act displaced federal
common law actions regarding water pollution discharges that are
regulated under the Act’s comprehensive permitting program, the Act
15. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 317.
16. Id. (“We conclude that, at least so far as concerns the claims of respondents, Congress has not
left the formulation of appropriate federal standards to the courts through application of often vague and
indeterminate nuisance concepts and maxims of equity jurisprudence, but rather has occupied the field
through the establishment of a comprehensive regulatory program supervised by an expert
administrative agency.”).
17. For instance, Professor Randall Abate argues that the Clean Air Act should not be interpreted as
displacing federal common law regarding greenhouse gas pollution from automobiles because the statute
does not establish a comprehensive regulatory system to address such pollution in the way that the
amended Clean Water Act regulated point source discharges of water pollution. See Randall S. Abate,
Automobile Emissions and Climate Change Impacts: Employing Public Nuisance Doctrine as Part of a
“Global Warming Solution” in California, 40 CONN. L. REV. 591, 605–07 (2008). Professor Jonathan
Zasloff disagrees, arguing that the statute should be read to displace federal common law regarding harm
caused by greenhouse gases. See Jonathan Zasloff, The Judicial Carbon Tax: Reconstructing Public
Nuisance and Climate Change, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1827, 1848–49 (2008). Professor Zasloff relies, in
part, on the suggestion by Justice Rehnquist, in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, that the Court “start[s] with
the assumption” that statutes displace federal common law, due to separation of powers principles.
Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 317. Part III of this Article examines some of the recent federal court
decisions that explore the Clean Air Act, greenhouse gases, and displacement of federal common law.
18. Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 327–29.
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does not preempt state common law actions for harm caused by those
discharges, as long as the actions are based on the common law of the
discharging state.19
After the Court’s decision in Ouellette, it was clear that while the
common law’s role in addressing environmental problems was
diminished by the development of federal, state, and local public law,
common law was still an important tool for addressing environmental
problems. When exploring the importance of common law in the age
of environmental statutes, commentators often stress that the
common law provides remedies that are not available under most
statutes.20 While federal and state environmental statutes generally
provide for declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent future
violations, they do not generally provide any relief for property
damage or personal injury.21 Common law nuisance, trespass,
negligence and strict liability actions often remain the only option for
recovering those damages.
In the same way that the common law provides remedies that are
not available under public law, it can be used to address problems
that are either not addressed under public law or not addressed
adequately.22
While the common law plays those important roles in the modern
age of statutes, critics frequently assert that public law is a much
more efficient and effective tool to address environmental problems
and that it developed because of the failure of the common law to
address those problems. Specifically, critics often assert that because
judges in common law actions focus on narrow, specific issues
involving litigants within their jurisdiction, rather than on the
potential impact of those decisions on groups that are not involved in
19. Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 487 (1987). Unlike the analysis regarding
displacement of federal common law, courts begin with a presumption that federal law does not preempt
the “historic police powers of the States . . . unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”
Id. at 492 n.11 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp. 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
20. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 12, at 101; Klass, supra note 3, at 569.
21. See Klass, supra note 3, at 583. Professor Alexandra Klass also notes that while the Clean Water
Act and Clean Air Act might not authorize lawsuits to challenge pollution caused by activities that are
authorized by a permit, persons harmed by those activities can generally still seek remedies for their
injuries under common law. Id.
22. See infra notes 161–73 and accompanying text.
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the litigation, the common law can effectively address small-scale
local issues but cannot address broader national or international
problems.23 Common law judges are also criticized as generalists,
lacking the expertise to resolve the broader technical questions that
arise in environmental disputes.24 An agency administering a statute,
on the other hand, can collect data from a wide range of sources and
employ experts to set pollution limits on a national or international
basis after considering the broader impacts of limiting pollution to
specific levels.25
Critics also argue that public law is preferable to common law
because the common law develops slowly, does not develop
uniformly, and is retrospective in nature.26
Common law and public law should not, however, be viewed as
alternative regimes for addressing environmental problems, but as
complementary regimes. Environmental statutes are frequently
interpreted in light of common law principles and enacted or
amended in response to developments in the common law.27
Similarly, the common law has evolved and developed in response to
the development and interpretation of public law.28 The following
section of this article explores those interconnections more fully in
the context of the recent mini-renaissance in common law actions.
II. WHY NOW?: REASONS FOR THE COMMON LAW RENAISSANCE
While common law actions to address environmental problems
declined with the explosion of public law, a wave of high-profile
private and public nuisance actions over the past few years may
23. See Ruhl, supra note 13, at 777–79; Klass, supra note 3, at 598; see also Jason J. Czarnezki &
Mark L. Thomsen, Advancing the Rebirth of Environmental Common Law, 34 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 1, 7 (2007).
24. See Ruhl, supra note 13, at 779.
25. See Klass, supra note 3, at 569.
26. See Ruhl, supra note 13, at 779; Klass, supra note 3, at 569, 583.
27. See, e.g., Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1881 (2009)
(relying on the Restatement of Torts to interpret the liability provisions of Superfund); United States v.
Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1382 (8th Cir. 1989) (incorporating common law principles
regarding liability for acts of independent contractors).
28. See Klass, supra note 3, at 584–99.
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signal the beginning of a mini-renaissance in common law
environmental protection actions. Professor Alexandra Klass suggests
that the trend toward using public nuisance law and other common
law tools to address broader environmental problems is consistent
with an “instrumentalist” vision for the common law, where nuisance
and other tort actions serve as a separate branch of public regulatory
law that is intended to deter undesirable conduct, spread societal
losses, and compensate victims of wrongdoing.29 She suggests that
the instrumentalist vision has taken precedence over the alternative
vision for tort law, that of corrective justice, which views the
common law as merely a means to obtain redress for private
wrongs.30
Many other factors have influenced the reinvigoration of the
common law. First, enforcement of federal and state environmental
statutes and regulations has been weak in many areas and nonexistent in others.31 Without an effective public law option, common
law is the only tool to address some environmental problems.
In the past decade, the Supreme Court has also played an important
role in reinvigorating common law actions by issuing several rulings
based on principles of federalism and the Commerce Clause that limit
federal authority to address environmental problems and expand state
authority.32 The Court’s recent decisions have narrowed federal
authority to regulate under the Commerce Clause and have spurred
courts and agencies to interpret federal regulatory authority under
environmental statutes more narrowly.33 Thousands of acres of
wetlands and hundreds of miles of waters that were protected under
29. See Alexandra B. Klass, Tort Experiments in the Laboratories of Democracy, 50 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1501, 1505–06, 1508 n.19 (2009).
30. Id. Professor Klass notes, however, that while the recent public nuisance actions to address
climate change are examples of tort law as a form of public law, common law actions to address harm
caused by hazardous waste disposal often resemble the private law model of tort law. Id. at 1529–36.
31. See Czarnezki & Thomsen, supra note 23, at 6–7; Klass, supra note 3, at 581.
32. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995).
33. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook
County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 173–74 (2001). In both cases, the Court interpreted
the Clean Water Act narrowly to avoid a question regarding whether regulation of particular intrastate
waters under the Act violated the Commerce Clause.
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the Federal Clean Water Act are no longer accorded the same
protection in light of those decisions.34 The Court’s expansion of
state power at the expense of federal power extends beyond the
Commerce Clause, though. In fact, during the 2009 Supreme Court
term, in every environmental case where federalism concerns were
implicated, the Court ruled in favor of state or local governments.35
The Court also may have increased opportunities for citizens to bring
common law actions for harm caused by environmental problems by
issuing a ruling in Massachusetts v. EPA that establishes a rather
generous standing standard for environmental plaintiffs.36 Depending
on how the case is interpreted and applied, this ruling could make it
easier for plaintiffs to establish standing to sue even though the harm
they suffer from pollution is caused by a variety of sources and the
relief sought in the lawsuit does not fully redress their harm.37
Other factors could also play a role in fostering a more significant
increase in common law actions to protect the environment. Professor
J.B. Ruhl argues that a growing awareness of the economic value of
ecosystems and the development of the field of ecological economics
could spur a wave of lawsuits to address “ecological nuisances.”38 He
suggests that the ability to quantify the economic value of natural
34. See James Murphy & Stephen M. Johnson, Significant Flaws: Why the Rapanos Guidance
Misinterprets the Law, Fails to Protect Waters, and Provides Little Certainty, 15 SE. ENVTL. L.J. 431,
455–56 (2007).
35. See Stephen M. Johnson, The Roberts Court and the Environment, 37 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
317, 333 (2009).
36. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2006). Although the case did not involve a challenge under
common law, the standing analysis used by the Court should apply to plaintiffs in common law actions
as well.
37. The Court concluded that the EPA’s actions caused the plaintiffs’ harm because they
“contributed” to the harm, even though there were many other causes of their harm, and that the
plaintiffs satisfied the “redressability” requirement for standing because the relief they sought would
reduce their harm “to some extent.” Id. at 523–26. The Court stressed that the plaintiffs need not prove
that the relief they sought would relieve their “every injury.” Id. at 525 (quoting Larson v. Valente, 456
U.S. 228, 243 n.15 (1982)). However, it is not clear how broadly the decision will be applied. As the
Court noted in its standing analysis, it was significant that the plaintiffs in the case were states and that
they were suing to enforce a procedural right. Id. at 517–21.
38. See Ruhl, supra note 13, at 756–57. Although it might still be difficult to put a precise dollar
figure on the total value of ecosystem services, Professor Ruhl argues that there is growing recognition
that ecosystems provide many economic values, including flood mitigation and groundwater recharge
from wetlands, water filtration and sediment capture from forests, and nutrient cycling, gas regulation,
thermal regulation and carbon sequestration from other ecosystems. Id.
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resources has made it easier for plaintiffs to prove that a defendant’s
action causes specific and measurable harms to those resources that
have specific and measurable impacts on the plaintiffs.39
Professor Alexandra Klass agrees that advances in science make it
easier for plaintiffs to prevail in nuisance actions, and she argues that
public law contributes to that dynamic by requiring the collection and
reporting of data that can be used by litigants to prove that a
defendant’s action is a nuisance and causes the plaintiff’s harm.40 She
also notes that courts frequently look to the broad environmentally
protective purposes of public laws in determining how to interpret
and apply the common law and the appropriateness of different types
of damages under the common law.41 She argues that public law has
influenced the development of common law in the past and continues
to influence the development of common law today.42 Finally,
advocates of an expansion of common law tools to address
environmental problems suggest that many of the traditional
criticisms of the use of the common law are misguided. Specifically,
they argue that the local nature of decision making in common law
courts is often an advantage for dealing with environmental
problems, rather than a disadvantage, because the judges, due to their
proximity to the problem, are in a better position to determine the
effect of an activity on a community and to balance equities to
39. Id. He points out that ecological economics and the development of ecosystem services valuation
have already caused an expansion of the common law by prompting an expansion of public trust
principles. Id.
40. See Klass, supra note 3, at 591–94.
41. Id. at 587–89. For instance, she points out that in light of the enactment of the federal Superfund
law, which imposes strict liability on a wide variety of persons for releases of hazardous substances,
many state courts have held persons strictly liable under common law for environmental contamination
caused by such releases. Id. at 587. She also notes that state courts have frequently allowed common law
plaintiffs to recover permanent “environmental stigma damages” in addition to cleanup costs for
contamination of their property, in light of the stigma imposed on their property by the federal
regulatory regime for hazardous waste cleanups. Id. at 588–89.
42. Id. at 548–55. She notes that scholars and legal authorities including Dean Roscoe Pound, Justice
Benjamin Cardozo, and Judge Henry Friendly have emphasized the importance of the evolution of
common law in response to statutes. Id. All of those authorities emphasized the important role that
common law judges play in “balancing policies with a goal of achieving a pragmatic . . . solution,” as
opposed to simply declaring “what the law is.” Id. at 547, 549. She asserts, however, that courts have
thus far underutilized the public law as a tool to model common law regarding environmental protection.
Id. at 547, 557, 565.
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determine an appropriate solution to the problem.43 Professor Ruhl
suggests that common law courts would be particularly adept at
addressing “ecological nuisances,” since most claims for such
nuisances would focus on a primarily local harm.44 Many
commentators agree that common law judges will be free from the
political pressure that might otherwise be asserted against
government agencies.45
In response to claims that judges cannot weigh and balance broad
issues with national and international impacts, advocates of common
law actions to protect the environment argue that courts can resolve
the environmental disputes before them without making those
broader policy decisions.46
III. THE COMMON LAW RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE
AND DISASTER
While it is not yet clear that there has been a renaissance in
common law actions to protect the environment, it is clear that there
have been some high profile common law actions brought in the past
few years to address the environmental problems that are being
caused by global climate change and natural disasters like Hurricane
Katrina. Both the Second and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeal issued
opinions allowing plaintiffs to proceed with nuisance actions for
damages related to global warming, despite challenges by the
defendants that the plaintiffs lacked standing and that the claims were

43. See Klass, supra note 3, at 573, 582.
44. See Ruhl, supra note 13, at 778.
45. See Klass, supra note 3, at 581.
46. Jonathan Zasloff argues, for instance, that courts can award money damages rather than
injunctions for harm caused by public nuisances, in order to avoid the criticism that courts lack the
competence to manage broad injunctions against public nuisances. See Zasloff, supra note 17, at 1838.
One of the benefits of damages, Zasloff notes, is that the defendant can decide whether it is more
economical to pay damages and continue to pollute, or to stop polluting. Id. Even in cases where courts
are called upon to issue injunctions, Alexandra Klass argues that courts can decide whether to issue the
injunction in a case like Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970), by balancing the
harms to the parties before the court rather than by examining the complex interstate air pollution issues
that extended beyond the dispute in the case. See Klass, supra note 3, at 572.
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non-justiciable political questions.47 The Fifth Circuit subsequently
vacated its decision, though, when it agreed to rehear the case en
banc.48 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is likely to address
similar standing and justiciability questions shortly in a nuisance case
brought by residents of Kivalina, Alaska, a small village that is
disappearing due to global climate change.49 In addition to those
developments in climate change litigation, the federal courts in
Louisiana have issued some significant rulings recently in common
law actions related to damage caused by hurricanes.50
A. Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co.
In September 2009, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that a coalition of states and land trusts could
proceed with litigation against several electric power companies for
injuries that the plaintiffs suffered due to global climate change
caused, in part, by defendants’ emission of greenhouse gases.51 The
plaintiffs in that case, Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co.,
brought federal and state common law public nuisance claims and
sought declaratory and injunctive relief, rather than money
damages.52 The court held that the plaintiffs had standing to sue, the
claims were justiciable and governed by federal common law, which
was not displaced, and the plaintiffs stated claims for nuisance under
federal common law.53
47. See Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009), vacated, reh’g granted en banc,
598 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2010), appeal dismissed, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010); Connecticut v. Am.
Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009).
48. See Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 598 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2010), appeal dismissed, 607 F.3d 1049
(5th Cir. 2010).
49. See Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009). An
earlier case in the Ninth Circuit brought by the State of California against auto manufacturers addressed
similar issues. See California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68547,
at *5–8 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007).
50. See In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 647 F. Supp. 2d 644 (E.D. La. 2007); Barasich
v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., 467 F. Supp. 2d. 676 (E.D. La. 2006).
51. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 315 (2d Cir. 2009). New York City was also
a plaintiff in the case. Id. at 316.
52. Id. at 315. Specifically, the plaintiffs asked the court to cap the carbon dioxide emissions by the
defendants and then to reduce the emissions by a specified percentage each year for ten years. Id. at 314.
53. Id. at 315.
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The Second Circuit heard the case when the plaintiffs appealed the
district court’s decision to dismiss the case on the grounds that it
raised non-justiciable political questions.54 The Second Circuit
stressed that “‘[t]he political question doctrine must be cautiously
invoked,’ and simply because an issue may have political
implications does not make it non-justiciable.”55 Applying the six
factors articulated by the Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr,56 the court
reversed the district court’s finding that the plaintiffs’ claims were
non-justiciable.57 With regard to the first factor, the court held that
the issue in the case was not textually committed to Congress or the
Executive branch.58 Importantly, the court recognized that the
plaintiffs were not asking the court to fashion a comprehensive
solution to global climate change but were merely seeking to limit
emissions from six domestic coal-fired power plants that were
allegedly causing a public nuisance.59 The court concluded that in the
common law nuisance case at bar, “[t]he department to whom this
issue has been ‘constitutionally committed’ is none other than our
own—the Judiciary.”60 With regard to the second Baker factor, the
court concluded that there were judicially manageable standards

54. Id. at 314. The district court determined that the case was non-justiciable based on the third
Baker factor, finding that the plaintiffs’ claims were “impossib[le] [to] decid[e] without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.” Id. at 319 (alteration in original) (quoting
Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)).
55. Id. at 323 (citation omitted) (quoting Can v. United States, 14 F.3d 160, 163 (2d Cir. 1994)).
56. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (“Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a
political question is found [(1)] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or [(2)] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or [(3)] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [(4)] the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or [(5)] an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or [(6)] the potentiality
of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.”).
57. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 324–32.
58. Id. at 325.
59. Id. The defendants had argued, to the contrary, that resolution of the case would impermissibly
interfere with the President’s authority to manage foreign relations. Id. at 324. The court noted that its
decision would not bind parties not before the court and would not set across the board domestic
emissions standards. Id. at 325.
60. Id. at 325 (alteration in original) (quoting Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44, 49
(2d Cir. 1991)).
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available for the court to use to resolve the claims.61 Although global
climate change creates broader problems, the court counseled that it
was merely being asked to resolve a public nuisance action against
six defendants and “that federal courts have successfully adjudicated
complex common law public nuisance cases for over a century.”62
With regard to the third Baker factor, the court held that it was not
necessary to await an initial policy determination to resolve the
plaintiffs’ claims.63 The court noted that while Congress has not
agreed on a comprehensive plan to address global climate change, the
actions that Congress and the Executive Branch have taken suggest
that they favor reducing greenhouse gas emissions.64 After
determining that the issue was not a non-justiciable political question
based on the other three Baker factors, the court suggested that
Congress or the EPA could ultimately overrule any decision that the
court made in this common law nuisance action if they disagreed
with the approach taken by the court.65
After rejecting the defendants’ non-justiciability argument, the
court addressed the question of the plaintiffs’ standing, which the
district court had declined to address.66 The court was reviewing the
standing question in the context of the defendants’ motion to dismiss
61. Id. at 329. The defendants argued that resolution of the claims would require the court to resolve
issues for which there are no standards, including how far domestic and global emissions should be
reduced, whether power plants or automobiles should be required to reduce their emissions, and what
impacts the reductions would have on jobs, the economy and security. Id. at 326.
62. Id. at 326, 329. As the court stressed, “The question presented here is discrete, focusing on
Defendants’ alleged public nuisance and Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries. As the States eloquently put it,
‘[t]hat Plaintiffs’ injuries are part of a worldwide problem does not mean Defendants’ contribution to
that problem cannot be addressed through principled adjudication.’” Id. at 329 (alteration in original).
63. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 331.
64. Id. The court held that Congress’s failure to adopt comprehensive greenhouse gas legislation did
not demonstrate Congress’s intent to supplant common law. Id. In fact, although Congress and the
Executive Branch have not yet adopted a comprehensive strategy to address climate change, the court
pointed out the following:
It is . . . fair to say that the Executive [B]ranch and Congress have not indicated they
favor increasing greenhouse gases. On the contrary, the political branches are at the very
least concerned about global warming, and Congress has passed laws that call for study
of climate change and research into technologies that will reduce emissions.
Id.
65. Id. at 332.
66. Id. at 332–33. The court noted “that when a lower court dismisses a case without deciding
whether standing exists and the basis for the dismissal [is overturned],” the reviewing court has an
obligation to address the standing issue sua sponte. Id.
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at the pleading stage, so the court applied a less rigorous standard of
review than it would have applied at a later stage of litigation.67 Since
the group of plaintiffs included states, as well as land trusts, the court
began its standing analysis by focusing on the standing rules that
apply to states when they are suing in their parens patriae capacity.68
The court suggested that it was unclear whether a lower standard that
previously applied when states sued in their parens patriae capacity69
was still applicable after the Supreme Court’s decision in
Massachusetts v. EPA.70 However, the court concluded that it was not
necessary to determine whether the lower standard applied because
the states met the traditional standing test set forth in Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife.71 The court also concluded that the land trusts
met the requirements of the Lujan test.72
Applying the Lujan test, the court concluded that the states alleged
present injuries, including declining water supplies caused by the
reduced size of snowpack, which were similar to the coastal erosion
that the Supreme Court held to be a sufficient injury for
Massachusetts in Massachusetts v. EPA.73 The states also alleged a
variety of future injuries, including increased illness and death,
67. Id. at 333. The court stressed that, at the pleading stage, the court “presume[s] the general factual
allegations embrace those facts necessary to support the [plaintiffs’] claim” and the court construes all
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the plaintiffs’ allegations in their favor. Id. Consequently, the
court noted that the plaintiffs in the case, at the pleading stage, did not need to present scientific
evidence to prove their injury-in-fact, causation, or redressability. Id. The court stressed that a more
stringent standard would apply at the summary judgment stage or at trial. Id.
68. Id. at 334. “[T]he States [we]re suing in both their proprietary and parens patriae
capacit[y] . . . .” Id. “Parens patriae is an ancient common law prerogative which ‘is inherent in the
supreme power of every state . . . [and is] often necessary to be exercised in the interests of humanity,
and for the prevention of injury to those who cannot protect themselves.’” Id. (quoting Late Corp. of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 57 (1890)). The states in the
case were suing to protect their natural resources and the health of their citizens. Id. at 338.
69. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 338. The court indicated that, based on the Supreme Court’s
decision in Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592 (1992), a state suing
based on parens patriae “(1) ‘must articulate an interest apart from the interests of particular private
parties . . .’; (2) ‘must express a quasi-sovereign interest’; and (3) must have ‘alleged injury to a
sufficiently substantial segment of its population.’” Id. at 335–36 (footnote omitted).
70. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 335–36 (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007)).
71. Id. at 338. Under Lujan, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he has suffered an injury-in fact that
is caused by the defendant’s action and that the relief that the plaintiff seeks will redress his injury.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
72. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 349.
73. Id. at 341.
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increased smog, beach erosion, accelerated sea level rise, salinization
of marshes and water supplies, more droughts and floods, and
increased wildfires.74 Although the land trusts did not allege present
injuries, they did allege future harm to the ecological and aesthetic
values of the lands they held in trust, which would interfere with their
efforts to preserve ecologically significant and sensitive lands for
scientific and educational purposes and for human use and
enjoyment.75 Although many of the future harms that plaintiffs
asserted would not occur in the short term, the court concluded that
they were imminent because they were certain to occur.76
Regarding causation, the defendants argued that global climate
change is caused by many factors other than their emission of
greenhouse gases, so plaintiffs could not prove that any specific harm
was caused by their activities.77 The court rejected that argument,
however, holding that (1) the causation analysis for purposes of
standing, particularly at the pleading stage, is not the same as the
proximate cause standard that applies to the merits of a tort action,78
and (2) the plaintiffs satisfed the requirement that their injury be
fairly traceable to the defendants’ conduct by alleging that the
defendants’ activities contributed to their injuries.79
Finally, regarding redressability, the court rejected the defendants’
argument that the plaintiffs lacked standing because the greenhouse
74. Id. at 342.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 344 (quoting Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 42–43, Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309
(No. 05-5104cv). The court wrote, “In describing imminence, the [Supreme] Court was not imposing a
strict temporal requirement that a future injury occur within a particular time period . . . . Instead, the
Court focused on the certainty of that injury occurring in the future, seeking to ensure that the injury was
not speculative.” Id. at 343. With regard to the future injuries of the states and land trusts, the court
wrote, “[T]hey are certain to occur because of the consequences, based on the laws of physics and
chemistry, of the documented increased carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.” Id. at 344. Although the
plaintiffs also alleged standing because the defendants’ actions caused an increased risk of harm, the
court did not find it necessary to determine whether that constituted an “injury-in-fact” because it
concluded that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged other injuries. Id. at 344 n.21.
77. Id. at 345. The defendants alleged that the plaintiffs were required to prove that the defendants’
activities alone caused the plaintiffs’ harm. Id.
78. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 346. The court also pointed out that even on the merits,
defendants who concurrently cause a plaintiffs’ indivisible injury can be held jointly and severally
liable. Id.
79. Id. at 346–47.
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gas emissions that the plaintiffs sought to limit through an injunction
would not prevent the plaintiffs’ injuries, because global climate
change is caused by the emissions of many other entities that were
not parties to the lawsuit.80 Citing Massachusetts v. EPA, the court
ruled that a demonstration that the courts could provide some
measure of relief is sufficient to show redressability, and the
proposed remedy does not need to address or prevent all of the
plaintiffs’ harm.81 Accordingly, the court determined that the
plaintiffs satisfied the redressability requirement for standing because
even though the relief that the plaintiffs sought would not itself
reverse global warming, it would slow the pace of emissions
increases.82
After the court concluded that the plaintiffs had standing to sue, the
court addressed another issue that was not resolved by the district
court and held that the plaintiffs made sufficient allegations to state a
claim for relief under the federal common law of nuisance.83
Applying the Restatement formulation for a claim for public
nuisance, the court concluded that the plaintiffs’ complaints
adequately alleged “an unreasonable interference” with a right
common to the general public.84 The court had little trouble
concluding that the states were suing to prevent harm to public rights
in their jurisdictions, including “the right to public comfort and
safety, the right to protection of vital natural resources and public
property, and the right to use, enjoy, and preserve the aesthetic and
ecological values of the natural world.”85 Although private parties
80. Id. at 348.
81. Id. at 348–49.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 349–71. Like the standing issue, on appeal, the parties fully briefed the issue regarding the
plaintiffs’ failure to state a claim. Id. at 349. Once again, since the court was considering a motion to
dismiss based on the pleadings, it stressed that it would “constru[e] the complaint[s] liberally, accepting
all factual allegations in the complaint[s] as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff[s’]
favor.” Id. (alteration in original). The court wrote that “[c]ourts apply a ‘permissive’ standard in
assessing public nuisance pleadings.” Id. at 370.
84. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 352–53. The Restatement definition of public nuisance is set
forth in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(1) (1965).
85. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 352–53. The court also concluded that New York City had
sufficiently alleged interference with rights common to the public within the city, including increased
heat related deaths and damage to the city’s coastal infrastructure. Id. at 366.
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must also demonstrate that they have suffered a harm that is different
in kind to bring a public nuisance action,86 the court concluded that
the land trusts adequately alleged such harm.87
Finally, the court rejected the defendants’ claim that other federal
laws displaced the plaintiffs’ federal common law public nuisance
claims. The court stressed that federal common law is displaced when
a federal statute speaks directly to the question otherwise addressed
by federal common law.88 The defendants argued that the Clean Air
Act established a comprehensive regulatory program to address air
pollution similar to the Clean Water Act program addressing water
pollution, which the Supreme Court, in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois,
determined displaced federal common law for interstate water
pollution.89 The Second Circuit disagreed, however, pointing out that
while the Clean Air Act established a comprehensive program for
regulating “criteria pollutants,” the Act did not currently target
emissions of greenhouse gases from stationary sources, like power
plants.90 The court also noted that while the Supreme Court, in
Massachusetts v. EPA, recognized that the EPA could regulate
carbon dioxide emissions from motor vehicles under the Clean Air
Act, the agency is only beginning to focus on using that authority to
regulate motor vehicle emissions and has not yet developed any
proposed regulations to address greenhouse gas emissions from

86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C (1965).
87. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 363. The court wrote that “although the Trusts are private
entities, they share similar features with public entities due to the fact that their lands are open to the
public and they are private property owners ‘whose charter, purpose and mission is to preserve land for
public use, enjoyment, and benefit.’” Id. at 368–69. The court also suggested that “[t]he magnitude of
the Trusts’ land ownership also constitutes such a difference in degree as to become a difference in
kind.” Id. at 369.
88. Id. at 374. The court pointed out that “dueling preemptions” apply when analyzing statutes and
their impact on the common law. Id. On the one hand, “separation of powers concerns create a
presumption in favor of preemption of federal common law whenever it can be said that Congress has
legislated on the subject.” At the same time, “[s]tatutes which invade the common law . . . are to be read
with a presumption favoring the retention of long-established and familiar principles, except when a
statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.” Id. at 374 (alterations in original) (citation omitted)
(quoting United States v. Oswego Barge Corp. (In re Oswego Barge Corp.), 664 F.2d 327, 335 (2d Cir.
1981); United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993)).
89. Id. at 378.
90. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 376, 380–81.
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stationary sources.91 Consequently, the court determined that the
Clean Air Act did not directly address the question otherwise
addressed by the plaintiffs’ public nuisance action.92 Further, the
court concluded that none of several other federal laws that required
climate change studies or reports displaced the federal common law
of public nuisance.93
B. Comer v. Murphy
Only a month after the Second Circuit issued its opinion in
Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co., a panel of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Comer v. Murphy,
overturned a trial court’s order that dismissed private and public
nuisance actions brought by residents and land owners on the
Mississippi Gulf Coast against energy, fossil fuel, and chemical
companies.94 In a diversity action, the plaintiffs sought money
damages under state common law based on private and public
nuisance, trespass, negligence, unjust enrichment, fraudulent
misrepresentation, and civil conspiracy, but not an injunction.95
Regarding the nuisance claims, the plaintiffs alleged that the
defendants’ actions emitted greenhouse gases that caused an increase
in global air and water temperatures and subsequently caused a rise in
91. Id. at 378–79. The Massachusetts v. EPA court held that the EPA could regulate carbon dioxide
emissions from motor vehicles under the Clean Air Act if it made an “endangerment” finding under the
Act and then issued regulations after making that finding. Id. at 379. The Second Circuit noted that, at
the time of its decision, the EPA had only made a proposed endangerment finding, so it had not issued
any regulations to address carbon dioxide emissions from motor vehicles. Id. The court also stressed that
while the EPA might be able to regulate emissions of greenhouse gases from stationary sources under
other provisions of the Clean Air Act if it made endangerment findings under those provisions and
issued regulations, the agency has not done that. Id. The court held that the Clean Air Act scheme for
regulating greenhouse gas emissions more closely regulated the program that was in place under the
Clean Water Act at the time that the Supreme Court held that the Clean Water Act did not displace
federal common law in Illinois v. Milwaukee (Milwaukee I) than the Clean Water Act program that was
in place at the time that the Court decided City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II). Id. at 379–80.
92. Id. at 381.
93. Id. at 387. The court wrote, “Congress has prescribed research, reports, technology development,
and monitoring, but . . . has not enacted any legislation that ‘addresses’ the problem that climate change
presents to Plaintiffs. . . . The linchpin in the displacement analysis concerns whether the legislation
actually regulates the nuisance at issue. Study is not enough.” Id. at 385–86.
94. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009), vacated, reh’g granted en banc, 598
F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2010); appeal dismissed, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010).
95. Id. at 859–60.
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sea levels that added to the strength of Hurricane Katrina, which
destroyed the plaintiffs’ private property, as well as public property.96
The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims on the grounds that
the plaintiffs lacked standing and the claims presented nonjusticiable
political questions.97
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit panel held that the plaintiffs had
standing to bring the public and private nuisance, trespass, and
negligence claims, and none of those claims presented non-justiciable
political questions.98 Regarding standing, since the appellate court
was reviewing the trial court’s decision to dismiss the claim based on
the pleadings, as was the case with Connecticut v. American Electric
Power Co., the court noted that general factual allegations of injury
may be sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.99 The court
restated the traditional Article III test for standing: a plaintiff must
demonstrate that (1) they have suffered an injury in fact, (2) the
injury is fairly traceable to the defendant’s action, and (3) the injury
will likely be redressed by a favorable decision from the court.100 The
defendants did not contest that the plaintiffs met the first and third
standing requirements, injury in fact and redressability, so the court
focused its analysis primarily on the second factor, causation.101
While the defendants argued that the chain of causation between
their emission of greenhouses gases and the plaintiffs’ injuries from
Hurricane Katrina was too attenuated, the court stressed that the
connection for standing purposes “need not be as close as the
proximate causation needed to succeed on the merits of a tort claim”
96. Id. at 861.
97. Id. at 860.
98. Id. The court dismissed the unjust enrichment, fraudulent misrepresentation, and civil conspiracy
claims for prudential standing reasons. Id. For those claims, the plaintiffs were not alleging that the
defendants’ greenhouse gas emissions caused their injuries, but were alleging that the defendants’ public
relations campaigns and pricing of petrochemicals caused their injuries. Id. at 860–61.
99. Id. at 862. As a preliminary matter, the court pointed out that the plaintiffs were required to meet
both state and federal standing requirements, since the case was a federal diversity case involving state
common law. Id. at 861. The court noted, however, that the plaintiffs easily satisfied the liberal standing
requirements of Mississippi law, which mandate that plaintiffs must “assert a colorable interest in the
subject matter of the litigation or experience an adverse effect from the conduct of the defendant.” Id. at
862.
100. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 862 (5th Cir. 2009).
101. Id. at 863–64.
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and an indirect causal relationship is sufficient for standing as long as
there is a fairly traceable connection between the defendant’s
conduct and the plaintiff’s injury.102 The court also counseled that the
defendants’ argument regarding attenuation was the same argument
that the Supreme Court rejected in Massachusetts v. EPA.103 In fact,
the court suggested that the connection in Massachusetts v. EPA was
even more attenuated than the connection in the case at bar, because
the Massachusetts plaintiffs were challenging the EPA’s decision to
not regulate greenhouse gas emissions, which led to an increase in
greenhouse gas emissions, whereas the Comer plaintiffs were
challenging the increased greenhouse gas emissions by the
defendants.104
The Fifth Circuit panel also rejected the defendants’ argument that
the plaintiffs lacked standing. The defendant’s argued that they were
not the sole or material cause of the plaintiffs’ injury because their
actions only contributed to the plaintiffs’ injury and global climate
change is caused by a wide variety of sources.105 Once again, the
court suggested that the defendants’ claim was similar to a claim
rejected by the Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA.106 The
Comer court wrote that “to satisfy the ‘fairly traceable’ element of
standing plaintiffs need not ‘show to a scientific certainty that
defendant’s [pollutants], and defendant’s [pollutants] alone, caused
the precise harm suffered by the plaintiffs . . . but rather whether ‘the
102. Id. at 864 (quoting Toll Bros. v. Twp. of Readington, 555 F.3d 131, 142 (3d Cir. 2009)). In a
concurring opinion, Judge Davis wrote that the plaintiffs’ claim would probably not meet the proximate
cause standard required on the merits, but he noted that the court was not required to reach that question
on appeal. Id. at 880 (Davis, J., concurring). While the majority stressed that a different standard applies
to causation for purposes of standing than the proximate cause standard that applies on the merits of the
tort claim, the majority also stressed that it was applying a more lenient standard than it would at a later
stage of the litigation because it was reviewing a motion to dismiss based on the pleadings. Id. at 864–65
(majority opinion).
103. Id. at 865. The court noted that the Massachusetts v. EPA court “accepted as plausible the link
between man-made greenhouse gas emissions and global warming, as well as the nexus of warmer
climate and rising ocean temperatures with the strength of hurricanes.” Id. (citation omitted).
104. Id. The court recognized that the Massachusetts v. EPA court offered “special solicitude” to the
plaintiffs in that case because they were states, but the Comer court noted that “the chain of causation at
issue here is one step shorter than the one recognized in Massachusetts, so these plaintiffs need no
special solicitude.” Id. at 865–66 n.5.
105. Id. at 866–67.
106. Comer, 585 F.3d at 866.
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pollutant causes or contributes to the kinds of injuries alleged by the
plaintiffs.’”107 Since it concluded that the defendants’ actions
contributed to the plaintiffs’ injuries, the court determined that the
traceability requirement for standing was met.108
Regarding the defendants’ claim that the plaintiffs’ claims
presented non-justiciable political questions, the Fifth Circuit panel
noted that the political question doctrine does not preclude a court
from reviewing disputes merely because they have political
implications or ramifications.109 Instead, the doctrine precludes
review of such questions if they are “political” in the sense that they
have been committed by the Constitution exclusively to the elected or
political branches.110 While the court recognized that the Supreme
Court’s decision in Baker v. Carr normally provides the framework
for analyzing whether a claim is a non-justiciable political question, it
held that a challenger has the burden of identifying a constitutional
provision or federal law that commits the issue in the case
exclusively to a political branch.111 Since the defendants in the case
did not identify any constitutional provision or federal law that
committed the issues in the case to the political branches, the court
did not apply the Baker test.112 The court also suggested that
“[c]ommon-law tort claims are rarely thought to present
nonjusticiable political questions . . . [because] ‘the common law of
tort provides clear and well-settled rules on which the district court
can easily rely.’”113 The court also stressed that “claims for damages
are . . . considerably less likely to present nonjusticiable political
questions, compared with claims for injunctive relief.”114
The Fifth Circuit panel ultimately concluded that “the questions
posed by this case, viz., whether defendants are liable to plaintiffs in
damages under Mississippi’s common law torts of nuisance, trespass
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. (first and second alteration in original).
Id. at 866–68.
Id. at 870.
Id.
Id. at 872.
Comer, 585 F.3d at 875.
Id. at 873 (quoting Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1991)).
Id. at 874.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol27/iss3/3

22

Johnson: From Climate Change and Hurricanes to Ecological Nuisances: Commo

2011]

COMMON LAW REMEDIES

587

or negligence, are justiciable because they plainly have not been
committed by the Constitution or federal laws or regulations to
Congress or the president.”115
Although the Fifth Circuit panel’s decision in Comer seemed to
brighten prospects for an expansion of public nuisance actions to
address broad environmental problems, the Fifth Circuit vacated the
decision in March 2010, when it agreed to rehear the appeal en
banc.116
C. California v. General Motors Corp.
Just as plaintiffs in global warming nuisance actions initially were
thwarted at the district court level in the Second and Fifth Circuits,
they have met little success at the district court level in the Ninth
Circuit. In California v. General Motors Corp., the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed a
nuisance action brought by the State of California against General
Motors, Toyota, Ford, Honda, Chrysler, and Nissan on the grounds
that the case raised non-justiciable political questions.117
The State of California sued the automakers based on federal and
state common law, alleging that the greenhouse gases emitted by the
vehicles the defendants manufactured constituted a public
nuisance.118 The State sought money damages and a declaratory
judgment for future money damages but did not seek an injunction.119
In its complaint, the State alleged that the defendants produced
vehicles that emitted more than 20% of the carbon dioxide emissions
generated by human activity in the United States. Furthermore, the
State claimed the emissions contribute to global warming that has
caused increased average winter temperatures in California, reduced
115. Id. at 870.
116. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 598 F.3d 208, 210 (5th Cir. 2010). The court subsequently dismissed
the appeal when it lost a quorum. See Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049, 1054 (5th Cir. 2010).
117. California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68547, at *10–11
(N.D. Sept. 17, Cal. 2007).
118. Id. at *3–5.
119. Id. at *4. Some commentators have suggested that a public nuisance action for damages may be
more likely to withstand a non-justiciability challenge than a claim for injunctive relief. See infra note
210.
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snow pack, increased flooding, increased erosion, increased
frequency and duration of extreme heat events, and increased
intensity and risk of wildfires.120 The automakers filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint based on non-justiciability, failure to state a
claim under California common law or federal common law, and
preemption.121
The court analyzed the plaintiff’s complaint under the Baker v.
Carr analysis for justiciability and indicated that, based on the third
factor, the court could not decide the case “without making an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion.”122
Even though the State of California sought money damages rather
than an injunction, the court concluded that it would still need to
balance the harm caused by the emissions from the defendants’
vehicles against the economic effects of limits on the emissions to
determine whether the defendants’ conduct was an “unreasonable”
interference with a public right, as required for a public nuisance
action.123 The district court further concluded that the deliberate
inaction of the political and executive branches indicated that the
other branches are still actively considering the issue.124 The court
felt that an award of money damages could undermine the strategic
choices of the other branches regarding appropriate action to address
global climate change.125
After determining that the plaintiff’s claim was non-justiciable, the
court concluded that it was not necessary to determine whether the
120. Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68547, at *3–4.
121. Id. at *5.
122. Id. at *19, 38.
123. Id. at *22–24.
124. Id. at *30.
125. Id. at *29. The court wrote that “[b]ecause a comprehensive global warming solution must be
achieved by a broad array of domestic and international measures that are yet undefined, it would be
premature and inappropriate for this Court to wade into this type of policy-making determination before
the elected branches have done so.” Id. at *30. The court also concluded that under the first Baker factor
the issues in the case were textually committed to the political branches because the claims implicate the
power of Congress and the Executive Branch over interstate commerce and foreign policy. Id. at *43.
Finally, under the second Baker factor, the court determined that there were no judicially discoverable or
manageable standards to govern resolution of the plaintiffs’ claims. Id. The court distinguished the case
from other public nuisance cases because the other cases did not raise similar national and international
policy issues. Id. at *46.
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plaintiff stated a claim under federal common law, whether federal
statutes displaced common law, and whether the plaintiff stated a
claim under state common law.126
Although the State of California initially appealed the court’s
decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
the State subsequently moved to dismiss its appeal when the EPA
took the first steps toward regulating greenhouse gas emissions from
motor vehicles, the President directed the Department of
Transportation to establish higher fuel efficiency standards, and
Chrysler and General Motors filed for bankruptcy.127
D. Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California dismissed another nuisance action tied to global climate
change in Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp.128 In that case, the city of
Kivalina, Alaska, and the governing body of an Inupiat village sued
several dozen oil, energy, and utility companies. The plaintiffs
alleged that the defendants’ greenhouse gas emissions contributed to
global climate change, which has diminished the Arctic ice, resulting
in erosion and destruction that will require the city and village of
Kivalina to relocate.129 The plaintiffs based their claims on federal
public nuisance law, state public and private nuisance law, and state
claims for conspiracy and concert of action.130 They sought money
damages, rather than an injunction, alleging that the relocation of the
city could cost as much as $400 million.131
The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims on the
grounds that they were non-justiciable and the plaintiffs lacked
standing to sue.132 Unlike the panel in the General Motors Corp.
126. Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68547, at *50.
127. See Kevin P. Holewinski & Kristin L. Parker, California Attorney General Dismisses Appeal of
Climate
Change
Suit
Against
Automakers,
MARTINDALE,
July
14,
2009,
http://www.martindale.com/environmental-law/article_Jones-Day_750198.htm.
128. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
129. Id. at 868–69.
130. Id. at 869.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 870.
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case, the Kivalina panel determined that the plaintiffs’ claims did not
run afoul of the first Baker factor, in that the issue in the case was not
textually committed to another branch.133 However, the panel
concluded, under the second and third Baker factors, that the court
lacked judicially discoverable and manageable factors to decide the
case and the issue required an initial policy determination by the
legislative or executive branch.134 Like the California panel, the
Kivalina panel concluded that the court could not balance the gravity
of the harm caused by the defendants’ actions against the utility of
the conduct to determine whether the conduct was “unreasonable” as
required for a nuisance action without additional standards.135
After finding the plaintiffs’ claims non-justiciable, the court also
determined that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue.136 The court
rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that they only needed to demonstrate
that the defendants contributed to their injury in order to establish
standing at the early stages of litigation.137 Contrary to the approach
taken by the United States Courts of Appeals for the Second and Fifth
133. Id. at 873. The panel stressed that “a mandate to regulate a certain area is not the equivalent of
delegating the exclusive power to resolve that issue to another branch,” and “the mere fact that foreign
affairs have been affected by a judicial decision does not implicate abstention.” Id. at 872–73 (quoting
Khouzam v. Attorney Gen. of United States, 549 F.3d 235, 250 (3d Cir. 2008)).
134. Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 873–77.
135. Id. at 874–75. The panel argued:
[T]he factfinder will have to weigh . . . the energy-producing alternatives that were
available in the past and consider their respective impact on far ranging issues such as
their reliability as an energy source, safety considerations and the impact of different
alternatives on consumers and business at every level. The factfinder would then have to
weigh the benefits derived from those choices against the risk that increasing greenhouse
gases would in turn increase the risk of causing flooding along the coast of a remote
Alaskan locale.
Id. (citations omitted). The court held that the precedent nuisance cases did not provide sufficient
guidance to determine whether the defendants’ actions were unreasonable. Id. Finally, the court held that
the political branches should resolve the dispute because
virtually everyone on Earth is responsible on some level for contributing to such
emissions. Yet [p]laintiffs are in effect asking this Court to make a political judgment that
the two dozen defendants named in this action should be the only ones to bear the cost of
contributing to global warming.
Id. at 877 (footnote omitted). The court, instead, felt that “the allocation of fault—and cost—of global
warming is a matter appropriately left for determination by the executive or legislative branch in the first
instance.” Id.
136. Id. at 882.
137. Id. at 878–80. The court recognized, though, that the causation requirement for standing is less
than “proximate causation.” Id. at 878.
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Circuits, the district court panel in Kivalina suggested that plaintiffs
must allege that the defendants’ conduct was the “seed of [their]
injury” and the plaintiffs’ claim must fail if the defendants can
identify alternative sources of the plaintiffs’ injury.138 Since global
climate change is caused by a variety of different sources, the panel
concluded that the plaintiffs were not able to demonstrate that the
defendants’ actions caused their injuries.139 Since the court dismissed
the federal claims, they also dismissed the state common law
claims.140 The plaintiffs have appealed the decision to the Ninth
Circuit.141
E. Barasich v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co.
Although the federal district courts in the Ninth Circuit have not
been receptive to plaintiffs’ common law actions for harm caused by
global climate change and related disasters, plaintiffs have had more
luck in the district courts in the Fifth Circuit. In Barasich v. Columbia
Gulf Transmission Co., the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana rejected the defendants’ motion to
dismiss the lawsuit, which was brought by thousands of residents of
Louisiana against oil and gas companies for the damages caused by
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, on the grounds that the suit raised nonjusticiable political questions.142
The plaintiffs sued the defendants based on negligence, among
other grounds, alleging that the construction of canals and destruction
of wetlands by the defendants reduced the natural buffer that the
138. Id. at 880–81 (alteration in original).
139. Id. The plaintiffs also claimed that they were entitled to special solicitude in the standing analysis
under Massachusetts v. EPA because they were sovereign. Id. at 882. The court distinguished that case,
however, on the grounds that they were not seeking to enforce a procedural right and were not states,
like the plaintiffs in Massachusetts v. EPA. Id.
140. Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 882. The court pointed out, “A district court may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over a claim if it has dismissed all claims over which it had original
jurisdiction.” Id.
141. See Rachel D’Oro, Kivalina, Alaska: Eroding Village Appeals Lawsuit’s Dismissal, Blames
Corporations
for
Climate
Change,
THE
HUFFINGTON
POST,
Jan.
21,
2010,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/01/29/kivalina-appeals-eroding-_n_441420.html.
142. Barasich v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., 467 F. Supp. 2d 676 (E.D. La. 2006). While the
case began as two class action lawsuits brought by nine plaintiffs, the plaintiffs filed a joint amended
complaint to sue on behalf of thousands of residents in seventeen different parishes. Id. at 678–79.
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wetlands provided to the residents’ property, thus increasing the
damage caused to their property by the hurricanes.143 The actions
were based on state law, and the plaintiffs sought money damages
rather than an injunction.144 In response to the defendants’ motion to
dismiss, the court applied the Baker factors and held that the case was
“nothing more than a tort suit under Louisiana law.”145 The court
noted that the Fifth Circuit had previously suggested that cases
seeking money damages, like Barasich, were less likely to be nonjusticiable than cases seeking injunctive relief, which could require
courts to dictate policy to federal agencies.146 The court also held that
federal water pollution laws did not preempt state common law
actions like those at bar.147
However, the Barasich court’s decision also demonstrates some of
the remaining impediments to reliance on common law actions on a
broader scale. Although the court concluded that the case did not
raise non-justiciable political questions, the court ultimately granted
the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted.148 Even though the
court applied a favorable standard of review to the plaintiffs’
complaint on the motion to dismiss based on the pleadings,149 the
court concluded that the plaintiffs did not sufficiently allege that any
particular defendant caused their injuries for their negligence

143. Id. at 678–80. The plaintiffs alleged that over a million acres of wetlands were destroyed by the
defendants’ activities and millions more were degraded. Id. at 679. The defendants’ activities caused
salt-water intrusion into the wetlands, which destroys the wetlands vegetation, converting them to open
water. Id. The plaintiffs sued for negligence, based on Article 2315 of the Louisiana Civil Code, as well
as strict liability, based on Article 667 of the Code. Id. at 679–80.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 684. The defendants argued that the case required an initial policy determination by the
political branches because it implicated energy policy, economic development, and environmental
protection, and the balance between those interests. Id. at 686. However, the court concluded that an
initial policy determination is unnecessary when there are judicially manageable standards to apply. Id.
at 686–87.
146. Id. at 685–86.
147. Id. at 688.
148. Barasich, 467 F. Supp. 2d at 695.
149. The court accepted all facts in the pleadings as true and interpreted the facts in the light most
favorable to the plaintiffs, the non-moving party. Id. at 680.
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claim.150 While a plaintiff could make out its prima facie case for
negligence by demonstrating that a defendant’s actions were a
concurrent cause of the plaintiffs’ harm and were also a substantial
factor in contributing to that harm, the plaintiffs did not allege that
their injuries were caused by any particular defendant.151 The court
counseled, “The plaintiffs cannot impose liability on a defendant
absent a showing of individual causation. The Fifth Circuit has
repeatedly rejected theories of group liability or market share
liability.”152
Although the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ lawsuit, the court
instructed the plaintiffs on a future course of action that might be
more fruitful. The court wrote:
By all accounts, coastal erosion is a serious problem in south
Louisiana. If plaintiffs are right about the defendants’
contribution to this development, perhaps a more focused, less
ambitious lawsuit between parties who are proximate in time and
space, with a less attenuated connection between the defendant’s
conduct and the plaintiff’s loss, would be the way to test their
theory.153

F. In Re Katrina Canal Breaches Consolidated Litigation
The final significant district court decision involving common law
claims relating to global climate change or natural disasters was In re
Katrina Canal Breaches Consolidated Litigation.154 In that case,
several residents of New Orleans sued the United States for damages
they suffered in light of the failure of levees during Hurricane

150. Id. at 691. The court also determined that the defendants did not owe a duty to the plaintiffs to
protect them from damages caused by hurricanes because the harm was too attenuated. Id. at 693. For
the strict liability claim that was based on Article 667 of the Louisiana Civil Code, the court determined
that the statute only imposed strict liability for ultra-hazardous activities on “neighbors” of the plaintiffs
and that the defendants were not “neighbors” under the statute. Id. at 690.
151. Id. at 694–95.
152. Id. at 694.
153. Id. at 695.
154. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 647 F. Supp. 2d 644 (E.D. La. 2007).
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Katrina.155 The plaintiffs brought an action for money damages under
state law, alleging that the Army Corps of Engineers was negligent in
constructing and maintaining the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet, a
channel from New Orleans to the Gulf of Mexico, and that its
negligence caused increased velocity of water in the channel during
Hurricane Katrina, which led to the destruction of the levees that
caused the harm to the plaintiffs’ properties.156 The plaintiffs alleged
that the Corps was aware that “wave wash” caused when large
vessels navigated the channel would widen the channel and erode the
berms protecting the levees in the vicinity of the channel and that
some of the levees would incrementally lower over time due to lateral
displacement of soil.157 The plaintiffs also alleged that the Corps’
dredging in the channel caused salt-water intrusion that destroyed
wetlands and increased wave force in the channel.158
Unlike many of the other cases described above, the defendant did
not argue that the claims were non-justiciable, and they did not argue
that the plaintiffs lacked standing. The case is significant, however,
because the court concluded that the defendant’s actions, over a
course of several decades, caused the plaintiffs’ injuries.159 Even
though the defendant’s actions were combined with the much more
destructive force of Hurricane Katrina, the court concluded that the
defendant’s actions were concurring causes of the plaintiffs’ injuries,
so the defendant could be held liable.160
IV. BEYOND CLIMATE CHANGE AND DISASTER: NEW AVENUES FOR
THE COMMON LAW
Although the recent mini-renaissance in common law
environmental protection lawsuits has focused on global climate
155. Id. at 647–48.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 653–79.
158. Id. at 665–75.
159. Id. at 697–98.
160. In re Katrina, 647 F. Supp. 2d at 697–98. The Corps argued that the plaintiffs’ injuries were
caused by the “shear force of Hurricane Katrina and its resultant storm surge,” rather than a combination
of the two. Id. at 681.
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change and disasters, it could reinvigorate the use of the common law
to address several other problems that are not being adequately
addressed by federal or state public law. While it may still be unclear
in some cases whether the common law actions would be based on a
federal common law or state common law, the federal environmental
statutes will generally preserve common law remedies.161
Several of the global climate change lawsuits were public nuisance
actions, but for many of the issues that are not being adequately
addressed by federal or state regulators, private nuisance actions may
be more appropriate. This is particularly true when the harms caused
by individual defendants are localized and the plaintiff has already
suffered harm. Advances in science, coupled with data collected
under the public laws, can make it easier for plaintiffs to prove that
the defendants’ actions constitute a nuisance.
Private nuisance actions might be especially useful to target harms
caused to isolated waters, non-navigable tributaries of navigable
waters, and other waters that the federal government has ceased to
regulate in light of recent Supreme Court decisions.162 Such waters
often provide valuable benefits to adjacent landowners, including
flood prevention, pollution control, erosion prevention, and
groundwater recharge.163 As Professor J.B. Ruhl observes, since
experts have begun to assign dollar figures to these “ecosystem
services,” it should be easier to demonstrate that the destruction of
the ecosystems is an “ecological nuisance.”164 Professor Ruhl
recognizes that it may be more difficult for a plaintiff to prevail in a
nuisance action when the plaintiff’s property is physically remote
from the defendant, the plaintiff’s harm occurs a considerable time
after the defendant has acted, or there are many persons who are

161. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1365(e), 1370 (2006); 42 U.S.C. §§ 6929, 6972(f) (2006); 42 U.S.C.
§ 9614 (2006).
162. See Murphy & Johnson, supra note 34, at 455–56 (discussing the narrowing of Clean Water Act
jurisdiction in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Rapanos).
163. See Robin Kundis Craig, Justice Kennedy and Ecosystem Services: A Functional Approach to
Clean Water Act Jurisdiction After Rapanos, 38 ENVTL. L. 635, 641–43 (2008).
164. See Ruhl, supra note 13, at 758–61, 784.
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acting to harm the waters.165 He also recognizes that it may be
difficult for plaintiffs to prevail in such suits when they have not yet
suffered any harm, but are suing based on anticipated harm.166
Nevertheless, he observes that when plaintiffs can identify and
quantify specific harms caused by destruction or degradation of
ecosystems, such lawsuits appear “rather plain vanilla as far as
nuisance doctrine is concerned.”167
Professor John Nagle cites Cook v. Sullivan,168 a recent New
Hampshire Supreme Court decision, as an example of the “ecological
nuisance” actions envisioned by Professor Ruhl.169 In Cook, the
plaintiffs sued their neighbor when the neighbor built his house in
wetlands, which altered the hydrology of the area and increased
flooding on the plaintiffs’ property.170 The supreme court agreed that
the defendants’ activities constituted a nuisance and upheld the lower
court’s order that required the defendant to move the house out of the
wetlands.171
165. Id. at 764–70. Professor Ruhl notes that it might be difficult, depending on the facts of the cases,
to demonstrate in some of those cases that the defendants intentionally caused an interference with the
plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of their property. Id. For purposes of nuisance law, a defendant acts
intentionally when they either act for the purpose of causing the interference with the plaintiff’s property
rights or when they know with substantial certainty that they will cause that interference. Id.
166. Id. at 763–64. Professor Ruhl indicates that the extent of the harm that the defendant’s actions
will cause will often be unclear until the defendant acts. Id.
167. Id. at 773. In order to prove that a defendant’s action constitutes a nuisance, a plaintiff must
prove that the defendant’s action constitutes an “unreasonable” invasion of the plaintiff’s property
rights, which requires a balancing of the gravity of the harm against the utility of the defendant’s
conduct. Id. at 772. Regarding the gravity of the harm, Professor Ruhl argues:
There is nothing about [that analysis] that puts ecosystem service nuisances in some
qualitatively distinct category compared to other nuisances. [Because t]he injuries
associated with loss of ecosystem services can be severe, they are often manifested in
physical damage to tangible property, and they can pose risks to residences and socially
valuable commercial and agricultural operations that are perfectly suited to their
localities.
Id. He also notes that, regarding the “utility of [the] defendant’s conduct,” as the economic benefits of
ecosystem services are quantified, it is less likely that destruction of ecosystems for development
purposes will outweigh those benefits. Id. at 773. While “many acres of coastal dunes, wetlands, and
forests have given way to development of one kind or another,” Ruhl points out that “[n]ow that we
know how economically devastating the loss of natural capital can be locally and regionally, the fact that
it was once seen as acceptable ought to play a significantly diminished role on defendants’ behalf.” Id.
168. Cook v. Sullivan, 829 A.2d 1059 (N.H. 2003).
169. See John Copeland Nagle, From Swamp Drainage to Wetlands Regulation to Ecological
Nuisances to Environmental Ethics, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 787, 797–99 (2008).
170. Cook, 829 A.2d at 1062.
171. Id. at 1067–68.
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Similar “ecological nuisance” actions could be brought to address
harms caused by non-point source pollution, destruction of
ecosystems that provide habitat for endangered or threatened species,
or harms related to practices involved in growing genetically
modified crops. In each of these areas, either the federal laws do not
provide for a comprehensive federal role or the federal government
has not aggressively used authorities under the laws to address the
issues.
Private nuisance actions might also be used more aggressively to
address the problems caused by non-hazardous solid waste
management, another issue not addressed comprehensively by federal
public law. Pollution data gathered under the Federal Emergency
Planning and Community Right to Know Act, as well as data
gathered by federal agencies under other environmental statutes
regarding the harmful effects of various pollutants, should make it
easier for plaintiffs to prevail in nuisance actions for harms caused by
non-hazardous solid waste management.172
Public nuisance actions could also be brought to address many of
these problems when the harm caused by the defendants’ actions is
more widespread. In addition, public nuisance law might be used to
address current problems other than those identified above and global
climate change. For instance, as industries expand the use of
nanotechnology or expand the use of new or existing toxic
substances, public nuisance actions might become attractive if federal
regulation in those areas remains lax or non-existent and scientific
studies can demonstrate that the substances cause specified harms.
Even more creative applications of public nuisance law may be on
the horizon. Professor Christine Klein, for instance, recently explored

172. 42 U.S.C. § 11023 (2006). The Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act
requires thousands of businesses to file annual reports with the EPA that describe the volume of various
chemicals and pollutants that they use or discharge into the air, water, or land each year. Id. That
information is included in a “Toxic Release Inventory” that is available on the web. U.S. EPA, TRI Data
and Tools, http://www.epa.gov/tri/tridata/index.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2010). Information regarding
the harmful effects of hazardous substances is available through the website of the Agency for Toxic
Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), among other places. See ATSDR, Toxic Substances Portal,
http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/substances/index.asp (last visited Oct. 20, 2010).
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the potential for using nuisance law to address urban sprawl, another
issue that has been largely ignored by public law.173
The benefits of addressing the environmental problems identified
above through common law actions are obvious and significant, if
such suits can be successfully brought. Several of the features of
common law that were criticized when compared to public law may
actually be advantages of common law when compared to a nonexistent public law or non-enforced public law. Although common
law is often criticized as slow,174 a slow process is preferable to
inaction under public law. In addition, to the extent that plaintiffs can
identify specific harms caused by activities that are unregulated or
under-regulated under public law, a local decision-maker examining
those concrete facts is probably in the best position to devise a
remedy to address the environmental problem.175 Further, when the
claims are brought in federal court or in state courts where the judges
are not elected, the decision-maker is less subject to political
pressure.
The flexibility of remedies under common law is another
advantage.176 If public laws addressed the problems outlined above,
plaintiffs would normally be able to pursue injunctive or declaratory
relief and, perhaps, civil penalties.177 The civil penalties, however,
would be paid to the state or federal treasury, and the plaintiffs would
173. See Christine A. Klein, The New Nuisance: An Antidote to Wetland Loss, Sprawl, and Global
Warming, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1155, 1213–16 (2007). Professor Klein views sprawl as an important
environmental justice issue, since the benefits of sprawl are felt by one group, while the costs of sprawl
are imposed on a very different group. Id. at 1213. As she suggests, sprawl can “contribute to the
abandonment of urban communities, undercut economic productivity, deny equal opportunity,
destabilize older suburbs, undercut education investments, reduce public safety, and worsen traffic
congestion.” Id. at 1215. While arguing for the application of nuisance law to the problems caused by
sprawl, she recognizes that it may be difficult to demonstrate causation or to prove a sufficient injury for
standing when bringing a nuisance action against a sprawling developer. Id. at 1219.
174. Klass, supra note 3, at 583.
175. See Ruhl, supra note 13, at 778.
176. For instance, Professor Jonathan Zasloff has suggested that the public nuisance lawsuits brought
by the states against energy producers and auto manufacturers are, in essence, a judicially created tax on
greenhouse gas emissions. See Zasloff, supra note 17. In a separate article, Professor Jason Czarnezki
suggests that courts could use their equitable powers at common law to create a common law fund to
address pollution problems as a remedy in common law actions. See Czarnezki & Thomsen, supra note
23, at 30–33.
177. See supra note 2.
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not be able to recover money damages.178 Through common law
actions, on the other hand, the plaintiffs can recover money damages.
Thus, there is some assurance that the money the defendants pay will
be used to address the problems caused by the defendants’ actions.
Conversely, civil penalties under public law may have a deterrent
effect but are not designed to compensate the plaintiffs.
Common law actions might also address environmental justice
issues not adequately addressed under public law. For instance, under
public law, a developer might be granted a permit to destroy wetlands
that provide flood protection and pollution control for one
community because it has agreed to buy “mitigation credits” for
protecting wetlands that provide benefits to a different community.179
While the public law would transfer those ecosystem service benefits
from one community to another, a court, under nuisance law, could
order the developer to compensate the adversely impacted
community for those losses. Similarly, while federal and state
pollution permitting laws and pollution trading laws may lead to “hot
spots,” geographic areas that are subjected to greater levels of
pollution than other communities, common law actions could provide
those communities with relief for those harms or a tool to prevent
further harms.180 Common law courts are generally in the best
position to address those concerns because they are likely to be
familiar with the local conditions that created the problems and have
broad experience balancing equitable factors to design remedies.
On top of all the other benefits of common law actions, perhaps the
greatest advantage of addressing global climate change, destruction
or degradation of ecosystem services, and the other problems outlined
above through the common law is that such actions can spur the
federal and state governments to adopt stronger public laws to
address those problems or to place greater emphasis on enforcing the
178. Id.
179. See James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental Law, 53
STAN. L. REV. 607, 648–67 (2000).
180. See Stephen M. Johnson, Economics v. Equity II: The European Experience, 58 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 417, 441–42 (2001); Stephen M. Johnson, Economics v. Equity: Do Market-Based Environmental
Reforms Exacerbate Environmental Injustice?, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 111, 129–30 (1999).

Published by Reading Room, 2011

35

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 3

600

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:3

existing public laws.181 While the mere fact that common law actions
are being brought may put pressure on legislatures and governments
to expand and strengthen public law, common law actions can also
provide valuable information about the environmental problems
addressed in those actions that can be used to shape the expanded and
strengthened public law.182 The United States Code is replete with
legislative provisions that were motivated by litigation.183 As noted
above, while public law may shape the development of common law
actions, developments in the common law can also shape the public
law.
V. NOT SO FAST: LIMITATIONS ON THE COMMON LAW RESPONSE
Although the judicial opinions discussed above may spur renewed
focus on the use of common law to address environmental problems,
the importance of the decisions should not be exaggerated. Serious
roadblocks remain on the path towards using common law actions to
address broader environmental problems.
A. Causation
Most importantly, while the decisions may ease a plaintiff’s burden
of proving causation for standing, they do not ease the plaintiff’s
burden of proving causation on the merits of the common law claim,
regardless of whether the claim is a claim for nuisance, negligence, or
strict liability. Several of the opinions stressed that causation for
purposes of standing is not the same as the proximate causation that

181. See Klein, supra note 173, at 1233; Zasloff, supra note 17, at 1827. However, Professor
Madeline Klass notes that robust pursuit of common law actions might also spur legislation that protects
industries. See Klass, supra note 29, at 1504. She points out that Congress often provides a federal
remedy when displacing state law, but has enacted several laws over the last two decades that displace
state law without providing a federal remedy in their place. Id. at 1538–42. None of those laws
addressed environmental problems, though.
182. See Ruhl, supra note 13, at 778–82.
183. See generally Oliver A. Houck, The Water, the Trees, and the Land: Three Nearly Forgotten
Cases that Changed the American Landscape, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2279 (1995); George Cameron Coggins
& Doris K. Nagel, “Nothing Beside Remains”: The Legal Legacy of James G. Watt’s Tenure as
Secretary of the Interior on Federal Land Law and Policy, 17 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 473 (1990).

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol27/iss3/3

36

Johnson: From Climate Change and Hurricanes to Ecological Nuisances: Commo

2011]

COMMON LAW REMEDIES

601

would need to be proved for the underlying claims.184 Frequently, one
of the biggest roadblocks for plaintiffs in nuisance and negligence
actions is demonstrating that the defendant’s actions proximately
caused the plaintiff’s injuries. In fact, while the Barasich court held
that the plaintiffs’ common law claims were justiciable, it dismissed
their underlying claims and counseled the plaintiffs to test their
theory in a “more focused, less ambitious lawsuit between parties
who are proximate in time and space, with a less attenuated
connection between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s
loss.”185 Similarly, Judge Davis, concurring in the Comer case, would
have concluded that the plaintiffs in that case failed to state a claim
on the merits.186 Thus, while the recent decisions might make it easier
for the plaintiffs to proceed with their common law actions, they
won’t make it easier for them to prevail on the merits.
There are several reasons why causation may continue to be a
stumbling block for plaintiffs that are trying to use common law
actions to address broader environmental problems. First, although
plaintiffs would prefer to use common law actions to prevent harm
before it occurs, it will be much harder to prove that the defendant’s
actions will cause specific harms to the plaintiffs when the harms
have not yet occurred.187 Since it will be easier to prove causation
when the harm has already occurred, it may be more appropriate to
rely on those actions to redress ongoing harms than to prevent
broader environmental problems.
Another problem that plaintiffs face regardless of whether their
lawsuit is based on past or future harm is that they must demonstrate
that the defendants conduct was a “but for” cause of their harm, as
well as the proximate cause.188 While it may be sufficient for
standing purposes for the plaintiff to prove that the defendant’s
actions “contribute to” the plaintiff’s injury, more will be required on
184. See supra notes 78, 102, 137 and accompanying text.
185. Barasich v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., 467 F. Supp. 2d 676, 695 (E.D. La. 2006).
186. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009), vacated, reh’g granted en banc, 598
F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2010); appeal dismissed, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010).
187. See Zasloff, supra note 17, at 1867–70.
188. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 430–39 (1965).
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the merits. When several defendants concurrently cause a plaintiff’s
injury, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s actions were a
“substantial factor” in causing the plaintiff’s harm in order to hold a
defendant liable.189 Traditionally, in tort, plaintiffs have been
required to demonstrate that the particular defendant who they are
suing caused them some specific injury.190 This is sometimes referred
to as an “individual causation” requirement.191 In most cases, it is not
sufficient for plaintiffs to prove that the defendant was the member of
a group, all of whom were engaging in activities that combined to
cause the plaintiff harm.192 That could be a roadblock for tort claims
like those in the Comer and Connecticut cases, where the plaintiffs
sued several defendants who may have contributed to the problems
that caused the plaintiffs’ harm, but where the plaintiffs would be
hard pressed to prove that any particular defendant caused a specific
individual harm to them. It could be less problematic in private

189. Id. §§ 431–33.
190. Donald G. Gifford, The Challenge to the Individual Causation Requirement in Mass Products
Torts, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 873, 874 (2005).
191. Id. As Professor Gifford notes, academics who adopt an “instrumentalist” theory of tort law are
less likely to demand proof of “individual causation” than those who adopt a “corrective justice” theory
of tort law. Id. at 877. Instrumental theorists believe that tort law pursues social policy objectives that
are external to the legal system, such as wealth maximization, accident prevention, or distribution of
losses over a widespread basis. Id. at 876. Corrective justice theorists believe that tort law is designed to
require injuring parties to repair the losses caused by their wrongful conduct. Id. at 877. For corrective
justice theorists, individual causation is essential for that goal. Id.
192. There is one traditional exception, set forth in the landmark case of Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1
(Cal. 1948). In that case, when two hunters acted negligently towards the plaintiff, but the plaintiff was
shot by only one bullet, the court shifted the burden to the defendants to prove that they were not the
factual cause of the plaintiff’s injury. Id. at 3–5. In many cases where plaintiffs may try to use common
law to prevent broader environmental problems, though, it may be unlikely that a court would apply the
rule from Summers v. Tice to ease the plaintiff’s burden of proving individual causation. There are two
important differences between that case and many of the potential environmental common law actions.
First, in Summers v. Tice, at least one defendant, and in fact only one defendant, was the factual cause of
the plaintiff’s injury. In many of the environmental cases, especially the global warming cases, the harm
may be caused by some combination of actions by many different defendants, rather than by one
individual defendant. See Gifford, supra note 190, at 910. Since one of the reasons for shifting the
burden is the belief that the defendants are in a better position to determine which one actually caused
the plaintiff’s injury, that rationale is undercut when none of the defendants likely individually caused
the plaintiff’s harm. Id. Second, in Summers v. Tice, the plaintiffs sued every person that could have
been the factual cause of the their injury. In many of the environmental cases, the plaintiff will not sue
every person that might be the factual cause of the plaintiff’s injury. Id. at 911–12. If there are other
persons who could have caused the plaintiff’s individual harm, it is not fair to put the burden on the
defendants who have been sued to prove that they are not at fault. Id.
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nuisance actions to address the “ecological nuisances” discussed
above.
Over time, courts have eased the burden on plaintiffs in some
“mass tort” cases to allow the plaintiffs to recover damages from a
specific defendant even though they could not prove that the
defendant individually caused a specific harm to the plaintiff.193 For
instance, in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, the California Supreme
Court adopted a “market share liability” theory to allow a plaintiff to
recover damages for birth defects caused by a type of drug
manufactured by several defendants, even though the plaintiff could
not prove which defendant manufactured the drug that caused harm
to the plaintiff.194 Under the court’s approach, each defendant was
“held liable for the proportion of the judgment represented by its
share of [the market for the drug] unless [the defendant] demonstrates
that it could not have made the product which caused [the] plaintiff’s
injury.”195
Similarly, in an earlier case, Hall v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours &
Co., a federal district court in New York adopted an “enterprise
liability” theory, allowing a plaintiff to proceed with a products
liability suit against several manufacturers of blasting caps, even
though the plaintiff could not demonstrate which manufacturer
produced the blasting caps that injured the plaintiff.196
However, those theories have only been used in very limited
situations, usually involving medical malpractice.197 In the context of
nuisance law or addressing environmental problems, courts have

193. See Gifford, supra note 190, at 878–80, 901–02.
194. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).
195. Id. at 937. Although the theory has been rejected in most contexts other than the DES context,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted a similar approach in 2005 in Thomas v. Mallet, 701 N.W.2d
523, 533 (Wis. 2005), to allow a childhood lead poisoning victim’s case against manufacturers of lead
pigment to proceed even though the plaintiff could not identify which of the defendants manufactured
the specific product that caused the plaintiff’s injuries. The “risk contribution” approach adopted by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court is a little different from the market share approach, though, because the court
instructs the jury, when assigning percentages of liability to the defendants, to consider the relative
degree of egregiousness of each defendant’s conduct in addition to its market share. Id. at 551.
196. Hall v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972)
197. See Gifford, supra note 190, at 904–15.
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adopted none of those theories, and it is unlikely that those theories
will be expanded to cover such areas in the future.198
Assuming courts will require plaintiffs to prove “individual
causation,” additional roadblocks may arise in the broader public
nuisance cases, like Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co.,
regarding the type of evidence that the plaintiffs may rely upon to
prove causation. In that case, as in Massachusetts v. EPA, the
plaintiffs relied, in part, on findings and conclusions of state, federal,
and international regulators, including findings of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and the National
Academy of Sciences.199 Some courts may rule that such evidence is
inadmissible to prove that a defendant’s action caused harm to an
individual plaintiff because (1) the threshold for the agency’s
determination that an activity may cause a harm is lower than the
threshold that would apply to proof of causation in tort; or (2) the
agency’s determination focuses on whether an activity in general can
cause a harm, rather than on whether the specific activity in question
causes the plaintiff’s harm.200 In each of those situations, a court may
conclude that the prejudicial nature of the evidence outweighs its
relevance.201 Similar problems could arise for plaintiffs in private
nuisance actions for “ecological nuisances” to the extent that they
rely too heavily on regulatory findings and conclusions.
B. Standing and Justiciability
Although the Second Circuit’s Connecticut decision and the
recently vacated Fifth Circuit Comer decision provided public
nuisance plaintiffs with reasons to be optimistic on standing, the
cases did not remove all barriers to standing. Both cases involved
challenges to standing at the pleading stage, so the courts adopted a

198. Id. at 904–15, 933.
199. See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 317 (2d Cir. 2009); Massachusetts v.
EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 507 (2007).
200. See Gilbert S. Keteltas & Joanne Lichtman, Are Regulatory Findings Admissible Evidence?, 34:3
LITIG., SPRING 2008, at 39, 40–41.
201. Id. at 43.
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very lenient standard of review.202 Even in those cases, it is not clear
that the courts would find that the plaintiffs had standing if the
challenges were raised on summary judgment or at trial, stages when
the court would apply a more demanding standard.203 Further, even
though those decisions seem to be clearly consistent with the
Supreme Court’s analysis in Massachusetts v. EPA,204 the district
courts in the Ninth Circuit adopted a more demanding test for
standing and it is unclear what standing analysis the Fifth Circuit will
adopt in Comer when the court rehears the case en banc.205
Even if courts adopt the standing analysis that the Second Circuit
adopted in Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co., plaintiffs
may find it difficult to establish standing in public nuisance cases
where the defendants’ actions increase their risk of harm, but they
have not yet suffered the harm.206 Finally, if private parties, rather
than governments, sue for public nuisance, they may still encounter
problems demonstrating that the injury they have suffered is different
in kind from the injuries suffered by the public as a whole.207

202. See supra notes 67, 99 and accompanying text.
203. However, the court’s decisions in those cases were significant not simply because they found that
the plaintiffs had standing, but because of the analysis that they used to make that determination. In both
cases, the courts adopted the Massachusetts v. EPA approach to find (1) that the defendants’ actions
“caused” the plaintiffs’ harm even though other actions combined with the defendants’ actions to cause
the harm, and (2) that the plaintiffs’ harm could be redressed by the relief that they sought even though
imposing sanctions on the defendants would not completely cure the plaintiffs’ injuries. See supra notes
78–82, 100–08 and accompanying text. Even though courts may require more factual support for the
plaintiffs’ allegations at a later stage of the litigation, the analysis that courts use to determine whether
the defendants’ actions cause the plaintiffs harm should not change. Similarly, the analysis that courts
use to determine whether the relief that the plaintiffs seek redresses their harm should not change.
204. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
205. Lower courts might conclude that the standing analysis in Massachusetts v. EPA should be
limited to suits brought by states, in light of the Court’s reference to the “special solicitude” accorded to
states in the standing analysis. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
206. The American Electric court did not determine whether an increased risk of harm constituted an
“injury in fact” for purposes of standing. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 344 n.21
(2d Cir. 2009).
207. Courts have interpreted the “different-in-kind” requirement narrowly to limit the circumstances
in which private parties can bring public nuisance actions. See Mandy Garrels, Raising Environmental
Justice Claims Through the Law of Public Nuisance, 20 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 163, 173 (2009). Mandy
Garrels criticizes the narrow interpretation as frustrating the pursuit of public nuisance actions by
environmental justice advocates, and she notes that the state of Hawaii has adopted a rule that allows
any person who has suffered an injury in fact caused by the defendant’s actions to pursue a public
nuisance action against the defendant. Id. at 178–80.
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Standing should be less problematic in the context of private nuisance
actions brought to address “ecological nuisances.”
In addition to potential standing impediments, justiciability claims
could still derail public nuisance actions to address broader
environmental problems when the plaintiffs are turning to public
nuisance because public law is nonexistent or not enforced. Just as
there appears to be disagreement within the circuits regarding
whether public nuisance claims to address global climate change are
justiciable,208 similar disagreements could arise if plaintiffs turn to
public nuisance actions to address other environmental problems that
are being intentionally ignored by the legislative and executive
branches.209 In those cases, academics suggest that courts are more
likely to find that the claims are justiciable when the plaintiffs seek
money damages than when the plaintiffs seek injunctive relief.210
Once again, private nuisance actions to address “ecological
nuisances” are less likely to be challenged as raising non-justiciable
political questions.
C. Regulating the Manufacture of Products Through Nuisance Law
Public nuisance lawsuits that challenge the manufacture of
products, like the California v. General Motors Corp. case, as
opposed to the use of products, could face roadblocks in addition to
the standing, justiciability, and causation problems identified above.

208. See supra notes 57, 98, 122, 134–35 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 172–73 and accompanying text.
210. See Zasloff, supra note 17, at 1838–39; Abate, supra note 17, at 612, 627. In discussing the
benefits of seeking money damages as opposed to an emissions cap in public nuisance actions relating to
global climate change, Professor Randall Abate writes:
The litigation strategy to pursue damages rather than injunctive relief is likely a
successful approach to avoid the political question doctrine concerns . . . . Courts are
empowered to decide tort cases, and only need to find unreasonable harm to award
damages. The state is not seeking a comprehensive solution to climate change in seeking
damages . . . .
Id. at 627. However, the district court in California v. General Motors Corp. found the claims nonjusticiable even though the plaintiff was only seeking money damages, rather than an injunction.
California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68547, at *22–30 (N.D.
Sept. 17, Cal. 2007).
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Opponents argue that it is inappropriate to apply public nuisance law
to the manufacture of products for several reasons.211
First, they argue that it is an unlawful attempt to avoid limits on
lawsuits against manufacturers that are built into products liability
law, including statutes of limitations, notice requirements, and
defenses based on the plaintiff’s conduct or exhaustion.212 More
significantly, it allows plaintiffs to avoid demonstrating that the
defendant’s product was defective, a fundamental requirement of
products liability law.213 Opponents fear that allowing plaintiffs to
pursue public nuisance actions against companies based on the
manufacture of products would blur the line between public nuisance
and products liability, leading to ambiguous and unmanageable
precedent.214 They argue that public nuisance is an amorphous and
poorly defined tort that gives judges too much discretion to find that
the manufacture of products is unreasonable.215
CONCLUSION
While the impediments outlined in the preceding section may
continue to limit the effectiveness of common law actions to achieve
broad environmental protection goals in the long-term, they are not
preventing plaintiffs from turning to the common law in the shortterm to address problems not addressed by public law. Public
nuisance actions to address climate change may ultimately fail in
court but may spur changes in public law, which may be the primary
benefit of this minor renaissance of the common law. It will probably
211. See Abate, supra note 17, at 626; Gifford, supra note 190, at 925–29; see also Victor E.
Schwartz & Phil Goldberg, The Law of Public Nuisance: Maintaining Rational Boundaries on a
Rational Tort, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 541 (2006).
212. E.g., Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 211, at 552, 578–79.
213. Id. at 578–79.
214. See Abate, supra note 17, at 626; Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 211, at 541.
215. See Abate, supra note 17, at 626; Gifford, supra note 190, at 748, 786; Schwartz & Goldberg,
supra note 211, at 541, 579. In contrast, Professor Abate believes that public nuisance should play a
valuable role in regulating the manufacture of products. He argues that “like all common law principles,
public nuisance doctrine needs to evolve and grow to respond to the changing needs of our society. . . .
Traditional federal and state legislative responses are important, but those processes move very slowly
and do not always offer meaningful recourse for the impacts in our backyards.” See Abate, supra note
17, at 626–27.
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not be the only benefit, however. As described above, while plaintiffs
may face significant impediments in public nuisance actions to
address climate change, they may have greater success using private
nuisance law to address narrower environmental problems not
addressed adequately by public law. Litigants could have great
success bringing “ecological nuisance” actions to address the very
real local effects of national environmental problems caused by lax
regulation of non-point source pollution and development of sensitive
ecosystems, as well as the abdication of regulation of isolated
wetlands and non-navigable streams. Those victories would be
valuable in their own right, but might also lead to changes in public
law to address those problems. It is not clear how successful plaintiffs
will be in pursuing common law environmental claims over the next
few years. It is clear, however, that the common law and public law
will only become stronger because litigants can pursue claims under
both.
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